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AN ELECTRIFYING EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS IN PSEG 
ENERGY RESOURCES & TRADE LLC 
ANNA NIKOLAYEVA* 
Abstract: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issues orders 
on electricity market auction results to ensure that electricity rates are just and 
reasonable. FERC issued an order accepting the results of the 2008 ISO New 
England forward capacity auction. PSEG Energy Resources (“PSEG”), a partic-
ipant in the auction, challenged the order on the grounds that it resulted in undue 
discrimination for the most necessary resources for reliability and violated the 
basic market policy goals. When FERC rejected this challenge, PSEG petitioned 
for review of the FERC order. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit reviewed the FERC order under a two-step Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council-like analysis and the agency’s failure to respond to 
public comments under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capri-
cious standard. This Comment argues that in PSEG Energy Resources & Trade 
LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit’s review of the 
FERC order represents an expansion of judicial review of administrative action.  
INTRODUCTION 
Electric power market systems, which are responsible for the sale of en-
ergy resources from generators, vary state by state.1 In some states and re-
gions, Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) or Regional Transmission 
Organizations (“RTOs”) manage the market in which these electricity transac-
tions take place.2 The market in New England is administered by ISO New 
England, which covers six states, 72,000 square miles, and has a generating 
capacity of 31,000 megawatts.3 ISO New England holds forward capacity 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N 
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp [https://perma.
cc/9XAF-Q8N7]. Electric power markets operate through transactions between electricity genera-
tors and anyone who resells the electricity to customers. What Is a Wholesale Electricity Market?, 
ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASS’N (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=whole
saleMarket [https://perma.cc/2SXV-G97U]. 
 2 What Is a Wholesale Electricity Market?, supra note 1. 
 3 About the FCM and Its Auctions, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/
markets/forward-capacity-market/fcm-participation-guide/about-the-fcm-and-its-auctions [https://
perma.cc/38A6-EWTM]. 
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auctions each year, during which suppliers compete to receive capacity pay-
ments in exchange for a commitment to supply capacity.4 
Similar to other commodity trading markets, these electric power mar-
kets are subject to regulatory oversight.5 The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) is a federal agency that ensures that energy markets 
provide electricity and other energy sources at just and reasonable rates.6 
FERC has the authority to issue orders that implement and approve tariffs.7 
FERC derives its authority from the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).8 
PSEG Energy Resources and Trade, LLC and PSEG Power Connecticut 
(“PSEG”) participate in the New England electric power market.9 PSEG chal-
lenged FERC in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit re-
garding FERC’s order accepting auction results in the market administered by 
ISO New England.10 ISO New England filed an intervenor brief in support of 
FERC and its interpretation of ISO New England’s tariff (“Tariff”), which 
was at the center of the dispute.11 
The D.C. Circuit is considered a semi-specialized court because it hears 
a majority of administrative law cases regarding federal agency actions.12 
Since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit has been the primary court for judicial re-
view over agency actions and interpretations.13 The seminal case in adminis-
trative law is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Forward Capacity Market, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/
markets/forward-capacity-market [https://perma.cc/46SS-UTAJ]. 
 5 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012); What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (May 
24, 2016), http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp [https://perma.cc/4FG7-EGZ4]. 
 6 See 16 U.S.C. § 824e; What FERC Does, supra note 5. 
 7 16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
 8 Id. § 824d–e; Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2005). 
 9 Bridgeport Harbor Station Combined Cycle Project, PSEG POWER LLC https://www.pseg.
com/family/power/fossil/stations/connecticut/bridgeport-harbor-cc-project.jsp [https://perma.cc/
QW7V-GPC7]; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, PSEG POWER LLC, https://www.pseg.
com/family/power/resources_trade/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/B3G2-MDK7]. PSEG Energy Re-
sources is a company underneath the umbrella of PSEG, which engages in the trading of whole-
sale energy. PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, supra. PSEG Power Connecticut is a subsidi-
ary of PSEG Fossil LLC and it owns and operates fossil fuel and natural gas power plants in 
Bridgeport and New Haven. Bridgeport Harbor Station Combined Cycle Project, supra. 
 10 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 665 F.3d 203, 205 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 11 See Brief of Intervenor ISO New England at 1, PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, 665 
F.3d 203 (No. 10-1103). The ISO New England Tariff (“Tariff”) is a document that outlines the 
rates, terms, and conditions for ISO New England and market participants. Transmission, Markets, 
and Services Tariff, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/participate/rules-procedures/tariff 
[https://perma.cc/5UTR-CB4V]. 
 12 John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two 
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (noting that the D.C. Circuit 
hears a disproportionate share of administrative law cases in the United States). 
 13 Id. at 554–55. 
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Inc., in which the United States Supreme Court established a two-step analy-
sis to determine if an agency should be granted deference in its interpretation 
of a statute.14 A court can also determine if the agency’s failure to respond 
meaningfully to objections is arbitrary and capricious under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.15 The D.C. Circuit’s exercise of its authority in reviewing 
FERC’s actions in PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. Federal Energy 
Resources Commission is no exception.16 
In PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, the D.C. Circuit considered 
PSEG’s challenge of FERC’s order based on Tariff provisions the FERC had 
previously interpreted.17 In its review of the order, the court considered 
whether FERC erroneously contended that the Tariff provisions were clear, 
and if it failed to meaningfully respond to objections raised by a party.18 This 
Comment argues that the holding in PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC 
represents a continuing expansion of judicial review over agency actions.19 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
ISO New England holds forward capacity auctions, an annual auction 
typically conducted three years before the resources will be utilized to pro-
vide the energy service.20 In this auction, ISO New England sets a starting 
price and then suppliers must respond with bids for the amount of capacity 
they are willing to provide at that price.21 As the auctioneer reduces the price, 
the suppliers reduce their capacity bids.22 An electricity supplier is successful 
in the auction when the supplier’s bid equals the amount of capacity that ISO 
New England determined is necessary to maintain reliability of the regional 
system.23 An auction’s results include multiple suppliers that successfully bid 
to commit to supply the necessary amount of energy to maintain reliability in 
the region.24 The amount of energy a supplier has agreed to provide for the 
set price at the end of the auction is called the “installed capacity require-
ment” (“ICR”), and the supplier must commit to provide the capacity stated 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 15 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 16 See 665 F.3d at 207; Golden, supra note 12, at 554. 
 17 665 F.3d at 205. 
 18 See id. at 208–09. 
 19 See id.; infra notes 81–112 and accompanying text. 
 20 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 205; Forward Capacity Market, supra note 4. 
 21 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 206. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
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in its bid.25 The forward capacity market auction and mechanism is based on 
a settlement and tariff approved by FERC.26 
The problem with the forward capacity market is that the auction ends 
when the price floor is reached.27 Because the price floor can be reached at a 
point when the supplier’s capacity bid exceeds the ICR, the suppliers could 
end up buying more power than the ISO New England market needed.28 To 
avoid this problem, ISO New England’s tariff (“Tariff”) includes a proration 
rule.29 Under this rule, the total payment cap is calculated by multiplying the 
floor price by the ICR and the price is prorated by reducing the amount each 
supplier receives so that the total does not exceed the cap.30 The quantity is 
prorated as the suppliers are given the option to reduce their capacity obliga-
tions by an equivalent amount.31 
FERC approved ISO New England’s addition of a sentence in the prora-
tion rule that stated that a decision to prorate a price must undergo reliability 
review.32 FERC approved this inclusion without allowing the public to pro-
vide comments.33 
In PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC and PSEG Power 
Connecticut (“PSEG”) challenged the FERC order that accepted the results of 
the 2008 forward capacity market auction administered by ISO New England, 
based on Tariff provisions that FERC determined to be unambiguous.34 In this 
auction, PSEG attempted to prorate the capacity of its Connecticut re-
sources.35 PSEG was barred from doing so because of reliability review, 
which ensures sufficient resources from the provider’s capacity supply to 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. An installed capacity requirement (“ICR”) is “a measure of the installed resources that are 
projected to be necessary to meet both ISO New England’s and the Northeast Power Coordination 
Council’s reliability standards, with respect to satisfying the peak demand forecast for New England 
while maintaining the required reserve capacity.” Installed Capacity Requirements, ISO NEW ENG., 
https://www.iso-ne.com/system-planning/resource-planning/installed-capacity-requirements [https://
perma.cc/D2UK-RKGF]. 
 26 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 206; see Blumenthal v. Fed. Energy Regula-
tory Comm’n, 552 F.3d 875, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that that the market auction mecha-
nism is reasonable market structure). 
 27 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 206. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) regulations mandate the Tariff as a 
requirement for Regional Transmission Organizations. Id.  
 30 PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 206. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies conducting certain actions, 
such as rulemaking and adjudication, must have a comment period open to the public. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c) (2012).  
 34 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 205. 
 35 Id. at 206. 
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power the system.36 As a result, PSEG could not reduce its capacity supply 
obligation in Connecticut because it would endanger the system’s reliability.37 
ISO New England and PSEG had two varying interpretations of the reli-
ability review language.38 ISO New England argued that the rule meant that, 
when the supplier’s resources are necessary for local reliability, quantity pro-
ration can be barred, but the supplier may still be forced to accept price prora-
tion.39 PSEG agreed with respect to the inability to prorate resources, but ar-
gued that it should receive the non-prorated floor price for the resources it 
provided.40 
PSEG raised two objections in filing a rehearing request: (1) that 
FERC’s interpretation resulted in undue discrimination against the resources 
most necessary for reliability, and (2) that the interpretation violated the poli-
cy goals of the forward capacity market.41 PSEG based its interpretation on 
these policy goals.42 FERC rejected PSEG’s interpretation and held that ac-
cording to the Tariff, ISO New England was required to impose price prora-
tion when reliability review precludes quantity proration in order to not vio-
late the total payment cap.43 In its order, FERC allowed ISO New England to 
reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity.44 Finally, PSEG peti-
tioned FERC for review of the order, which denied PSEG’s request for re-
lief.45 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) is the statute that lists the Federal Ener-
gy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) legal duties and grants FERC the 
authority to issue and review orders regarding electric utilities.46 The FPA 
was initially enacted as the Federal Water Power Act in response to the need 
to regulate water resources.47 In 1935, Congress amended the Federal Water 
Power Act and renamed it the FPA.48 The United States Court of Appeals for 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 205. 
 38 Id. at 206. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 205. 
 45 Id. at 207. 
 46 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) lists issuing and reviewing or-
ders to ensure that public utility rates are just and reasonable as one of FERC’s duties. Id. 
 47 See James C. Duda, The “Comprehensive Plan” Requirement of the Federal Power Act: A 
Senator’s Dream, a Congressional Mandate, and a Parameter for Agency Discretion, 28 B.C. L. 
REV. 523, 531 (1987). 
 48 16 U.S.C. § 791a; Duda, supra note 47 at 535 n.88. 
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the D.C. Circuit’s authority to review orders issued by FERC is codified in 
§ 313(b) of the FPA.49 
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc—the seminal case when it comes to 
agency deference.50 In Chevron, the Court considered whether the Environ-
mental Protection Agency should be granted deference for its interpretation of 
the term “stationary source” found in the Clean Air Act.51 In the holding, the 
Court established a two-step analysis to determine if the agency should re-
ceive deference for its interpretation of the statute.52 At the first step, courts 
must determine if Congress has spoken clearly to the precise question at issue 
in the statute.53 Then, if a court determines that Congress has not spoken 
clearly on the issue, that court must proceed to the second step and determine 
if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.54 If the interpretation 
is reasonable, the agency will receive deference in its interpretation.55 The 
policy underlying the Chevron doctrine is that, unlike judges, agencies have 
specific expertise in the area of law from dealing frequently with the subject 
matter.56 
In Colorado Interstate Gas v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
the D.C. Circuit applied a Chevron-like analysis to evaluate a FERC order.57 
Unlike the ordinary Chevron doctrine, which considers an agency’s interpre-
tation of the statute it administers, the court’s Chevron-like analysis was ap-
plied to the agency’s interpretation of a tariff.58 The court held that FERC’s 
interpretation was reasonable.59 In reaching this determination, the court’s 
Chevron-like analysis involved two steps.60 The court first considered de no-
vo whether the tariff unambiguously addresses the matter at issue.61 If the 
language is unambiguous, the D.C. Circuit held that a court must defer to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of the parties.62 If the language is ambigu-
                                                                                                                           
 49 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b). 
 50 See 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
 51 Id. at 840. 
 52 Id. at 842. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 843. 
 55 Id. at 844. 
 56 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 57 599 F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 58 Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (applying a two-step analysis to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute), with Colo. Interstate Gas v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 599 F.3d 698, 701 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying a two-step analysis to an agency’s interpretation of a tariff). 
 59 Colo. Interstate Gas, 599 F.3d at 700. 
 60 Id. at 701. 
 61 Id. (quoting Ameren Servs. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 330 F.3d 494, 498 
(D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 62 Colo. Interstate Gas, 599 F.3d at 701 (quoting Ameren Servs., 330 F.3d at 498). 
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ous, a court must defer to FERC’s construction of the provision, as long as 
that interpretation is reasonable.63 
In Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the D.C. Circuit further expanded on the Chevron analysis at the 
first step.64 The court considered Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.’s 
(“Cajun”) challenge to a FERC interpretation of a contract between Cajun 
and Gulf States Utility Company.65 The court remanded the case to FERC 
because it determined that the contract was ambiguous.66 The court noted that 
the agency is not granted deference in the determination of whether the stat-
ute is ambiguous.67 Therefore, the court can remand the question to the agen-
cy if the agency is incorrect in its determination that Congress’ intent was 
clearly expressed.68 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was enacted in 1946 to codi-
fy judicial review of agency decision-making and actions.69 Prior to the twen-
tieth century, there was no comprehensive body of administrative law in the 
United States.70 Rather, any rules regarding an agency’s administrative pro-
cedures were included in that agency’s enabling legislation.71 The turning 
point for administrative law was the New Deal.72 Because the New Deal leg-
islation did not create procedures to govern the actions of these agencies, 
Congress passed the APA in 1946 to categorize and regulate agency actions.73 
The enactment of the APA paved the way for courts to assume broad au-
thority to review agency actions.74 The D.C. Circuit can review agency ac-
tions under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, which allows a court to determine if an 
agency action is arbitrary and capricious.75 
In PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, the D.C. Circuit considered whether FERC’s failure to respond to the 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Colo. Interstate Gas, 599 F.3d at 701 (quoting Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 136 F.3d 810, 814–15 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 64 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 65 Id. at 1133. FERC’s interpretation of the contract was based on authority granted by the 
FPA. Id. 
 66 Id. at 1137. 
 67 Id. at 1136. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 208 (2016) 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 209. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 214. 
 74 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Elias, supra note 69, at 222. 
 75 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Section 706(2)(A) states in part: “The reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”  Id. 
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petitioner’s objections constituted an arbitrary and capricious decision.76 The 
petitioners, power companies (“PPL”), challenged orders made by FERC that 
rejected their agreement to provide electric power with ISO New England on 
a cost-of-service basis.77 In making this determination, the court relied on the 
arbitrary and capricious standard under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, which states 
that an agency must have a satisfactory explanation for its choice after exam-
ining all of the relevant data.78 The court noted that under the APA, the agen-
cy’s decision could not be reasoned if the agency does not answer seemingly 
legitimate objections.”79 Applying this standard, the D.C. Circuit determined 
that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to 
address PPL’s objections.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
In PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted 
PSEG Energy Resources and Trade LLC and PSEG Power Connecticut’s 
(“PSEG”) petition for review, and remanded the order by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for both issues brought by PSEG.81 The 
court remanded on the first issue to allow FERC to re-interpret ISO New 
England’s tariff (“Tariff”) in light of its analysis drawing from Chevron U.S.A 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council.82 In addition, the D.C. Circuit re-
manded the second issue because FERC failed to address PSEG’s objections 
regarding the interpretation of the Tariff.83 
The first issue considered in PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC in-
volved the interpretation of the meaning of the last sentence of the proration 
rule.84 The D.C. Circuit considered two questions about the meaning of that 
sentence.85 First, the court considered whether FERC incorrectly read the text 
of the Tariff as compelling the conclusion that it reached regarding the auc-
tion results.86 Second, the court considered whether FERC was incorrect in 
                                                                                                                           
 76 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 77 Id. at 1195. Cost-of-service is the revenue a power company must collect from rates that it 
charges consumers to recover business costs. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, COST-OF-
SERVICE RATES MANUAL 7 (1999). 
 78 PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1200. 
 81 665 F.3d 203, 210–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 82 See id. at 209. 
 83 Id. at 210. 
 84 Id. at 206. The last sentence of the proration rule requires that any proration conducted by 
the capacity market must undergo reliability review. Id. 
 85 Id. at 208. 
 86 Id. 
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failing to respond to the objections raised by PSEG about the undue discrimi-
nation of FERC’s interpretation and its contradiction of the basic policy goals 
of the forward capacity market.87 
The D.C. Circuit applied the same Chevron-like analysis used in Colo-
rado Interstate Gas v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to decide if 
FERC properly interpreted the Tariff.88 At the first step, the court considered 
if the text of the Tariff interpreted by FERC was ambiguous.89 The court not-
ed that the agency has the discretion to interpret the Tariff, rather than relying 
on the assumption that Congress required such an interpretation.90 The court 
remanded this issue to FERC, ultimately granting the agency the discretion to 
review the Tariff once again in order to determine if PSEG’s position was the 
more appropriate interpretation of the Tariff.91 
The next issue the D.C. Circuit considered was whether FERC’s failure 
to respond to the objections raised by PSEG rendered its decision arbitrary 
and capricious.92 The court relied on § 706 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) in its consideration of whether FERC’s failure to respond was ar-
bitrary and capricious.93 The court considered whether FERC’s counsel’s 
statements constituted a sufficient response to PSEG and concluded that it did 
not.94 As a result, the court held that remand was appropriate on the issue in 
order to allow FERC to respond to the objections raised by PSEG.95 
As a semi-specialized court, the D.C. Circuit has historically had judicial 
review over agency actions, as demonstrated in PSEG Energy Resources & 
Trade.96 The D.C. Circuit relied on Chevron and the cases that built upon that 
doctrine, specifically Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission, to determine whether FERC’s interpretation was proper.97 
Although the D.C. Circuit remanded the order to allow FERC to properly 
interpret the language of the Tariff, the court’s application of the Chevron-like 
analysis further extends its judicial review over agency actions under the 
                                                                                                                           
 87 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 208. 
 88 Id. (citing Colo. Interstate Gas, 599 F.3d at 701). 
 89 Id. at 209. 
 90 Id. (citing Transitional Hosps. Corp. of La., Inc. v. Shalala, 222 F.3d 1019, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. at 208. 
 94 Id. at 210. 
 95 Id. (noting FERC counsel’s rationalization formulated after the FERC decision was issued 
and quoted statement in footnote of rehearing order not a response to PSEG’s objections). 
 96 See id.; Golden, supra note 12, at 554. 
 97 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 209; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Comm’n, 924 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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Chevron doctrine.98 In its original form, the doctrine is used to determine 
whether agencies properly interpret the statute administered by the respective 
agencies.99 For other agency actions, such as agency interpretations of regula-
tion, courts have employed alternative forms of deference.100 
The D.C. Circuit’s application of a Chevron-like analysis to FERC’s or-
der signals a continued departure from the traditional use of the doctrine.101 
Judicial review of agency action has increased as agencies have gained more 
authority.102 The court correctly applied the Chevron-like analysis because 
FERC did not reasonably exercise its discretion when it failed to consider all 
possible interpretations of the Tariff.103 The court expanded its scope of re-
view under Chevron while still allowing FERC to retain its discretion in regu-
lating energy markets.104 
Alternatively, the D.C. Circuit’s use of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard does not signal a widening of judicial review, but rather makes cer-
tain that agencies face accountability for their actions and decisions.105 There-
fore, the D.C. Circuit acted within the scope of its statutory authority under 
the APA when it reviewed FERC’s order, as the APA’s chief purpose is to en-
sure that agencies are held accountable to the public.106 
Similar to the decision in PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. Federal Ener-
gy Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit viewed FERC’s failure to re-
                                                                                                                           
 98 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 209; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 99 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 100 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (applying criterion of 
administrative interpretation to regulation); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) 
(providing that agency interpretation of its own regulations must be based on persuasiveness of 
interpretation). The different analyses for agency actions stem from common law decisions exam-
ining different agency actions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. Although Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Skidmore v. Swift & Co. pre-
date the decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Bowles and Skidmore 
still provide relevant analysis with regard to agency deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; 
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 101 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; PSEG Energy Res. & 
Trade LLC, 665 F.3d at 209. 
 102 See Ronald A. Cass, Vive La Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between Administrative 
and Judicial Discretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1300 (2015). The growth in agency au-
thority can be seen in the expansion of the number of people employed by the federal government. 
Jonathon Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013), 
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cc/T6EH-LVEG]. The number of non-military workers in the federal government has grown from 
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spond directly to PSEG’s objections as necessitating remand.107 FERC’s fail-
ure to respond to PSEG’s two legitimate objections prevented its order from 
being fully reasoned and rationalized.108 In both of these cases, the D.C. Cir-
cuit exercised its authority to hold these agencies accountable.109 While Chev-
ron requires more deference for agency actions, the APA also allows courts to 
step in when an agency exercises its discretion without responding to any ob-
jections or concerns from the public.110 
The D.C. Circuit continues to pave a path for the growth of judicial re-
view through its applications of the APA and the Chevron doctrine.111 As 
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC demonstrates, courts will continue to 
use these tools to expand its review of agency actions.112 
CONCLUSION 
As the regulating agency for electricity markets, the Federal Energy Re-
sources Commission (“FERC”) employs its agency expertise and discretion 
to issue orders that ensure just and reasonable rates in the electric market. The 
FERC order at issue in PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. Federal En-
ergy Resources Commission was subject to judicial review by the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the court with the requisite expertise in administrative law. The D.C. 
Circuit considered the order by applying the basic doctrines of administrative 
law. The court’s application of the analysis drawing from Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council demonstrates the expansion of Chevron 
to agency actions that were not originally covered by the doctrine. Further, 
the court applied its authority under § 706 of the Administrative Procedures 
Act to ensure that FERC’s actions were held accountable. Therefore, PSEG 
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Energy Resources represents the continuing expansion of judicial review of 
agency actions by the D.C. Circuit. 
